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Abstract 
Taking as point of departure the claim that, in late modern societies, there has been shift from a 
focus on producing measures of life and death towards metrics of health and disability, this paper 
investigates how, through what means and processes was this transition achieved. It proposes that 
such questions can be addressed by analysing the transcripts and sociotechnical network of one 
single meeting held at the United States Senate on July 15th 1983 to assess the validity and 
sensitivity of life expectancy forecasts. The paper analyses how members of the Hearing 
transformed a weakly articulated set of differing life expectancy projections into a controversy about 
the issue of vitality and health in populations. Analysis of the Hearing proceedings suggests that 
‘calculative devices’ played a generative role in problematizing the relationship between forms of 
expertise, calculative procedures, data infrastructures and specific  expectations of the effect of 
technology on health and longevity. The paper details empirically that this re-composition was 
possible through a collective investigation – an opening up - of key instruments in the management 
of populations in ‘insurance societies’. 
Keywords: life expectancy; quality of life; calculative devices; insurance society.    
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Devicing future populations: Problematizing the relationship between 
quantity and quality of life 
Introduction 
A key issue within population science and epidemiology has been the longstanding 
disagreement about forecasts of mortality, life expectancy and health in contemporary 
societies (e.g. Siegel, 2016). This controversy is usually characterized as a divergence in the 
way the relationship between the ‘quantity’ (survival, life expectancy) and ‘quality’ (health, 
disability) of life is conceptualized and/or modelled. In the conventional version of the 
debate (Jagger and Robine, 2011), three positions, originally articulated in the 1970s and 
early 1980s, are typically identified. The first theory proposes that medical research and 
technology, while extending human life span, has also ‘prolong[ed] diseased, diminishe[d] 
lives and so increase[d] the proportion of people who have a disabling or chronic disease’ 
(Gruenberg, 1977: 5; cf. Brody, 1985; Kramer, 1980). The second theory, mostly associated 
with the work of James Fries (1980, 1983) suggests that, given a biological limit to human 
life span, preventive medicine and health maintenance programmes could delay the onset 
of disease and disability so as to minimize the gap between morbidity and mortality, leading 
to a ‘compression of morbidity’ or ‘rectangularization of longevity’. A third proposal argues 
that while medical technology might increase the proportion of people living with disability, 
its severity on average would be reduced, extending life expectancy in future populations 
(Manton, 1982).  
While this version of the debate emphasizes its academic character, hinging on esoteric 
issues such as the methodology for the measurement of health, its endurance cannot be 
dissociated from the significance projections of mortality, life expectancy and population 
health have for the institutional apparatus of contemporary societies. As the authors of a 
recent Lancet article – which claimed that by 2030 female life expectancy at birth would be 
higher than 90 years – put it, mortality and life expectancy forecasts are ‘needed to plan for 
health and social services and pensions’ (Kontis et al., 2017: 1). The sustainability of public 
and private health care systems, social care programmes and the provision of ‘old-age’ 
pensions depends on calculations of changing conditions of demand and use, and of the 
adequate financing needed. This, in other words, means that quantifications of future life 
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expectancy and states of population health are central to the contemporaneous politics of 
health care and social security.  
This link between knowledge of the health of populations and their management speaks 
directly to theorizations of governmentality, and in particular Foucault’s conceptualization 
of regimes of power-knowledge and forms of security. In brief, Foucault’s argument was 
that in liberal, governmentalized states, power is reliant on knowledge and management of 
‘a global mass affected by overall pressures of birth, death, production, illness’ (Foucault, 
2003: 243). This ‘mass’ – a population – is understood and deployed through a series of 
epistemic and political ‘apparatuses’ focusing on these aspects of the ‘mechanics of life’, 
thus giving rise to a particular form of biopolitics (Agamben, 2009). The making of 
population is thus contingent on the application of methods of data formatting and 
procedures of statistical analysis that render the ‘mechanics of life’ visible by ‘display[ing] 
constants that are easy, or at least possible, to establish’ at ‘the collective level’ (Foucault, 
2003: 246).  
Because the notion of population is founded on the epistemic assumption that it possesses 
its own regularities, from a Foucauldian perspective, ‘insurance or regularizing technology’ is 
therefore central to the apparatus of governmentality (Foucault, 2003: 222). For this reason, 
risk calculations about the chances of life and death – based on actuarial methods – have 
become fundamental to the deployment of the liberal Welfare State, an arrangement Ewald 
(1991) claimed underpinned the ‘socio-politics’ characterising ‘insurance societies’. This 
conjunction is evident, for example, in the establishment of social security programmes such 
as the Old Age Pension Reform of 1908 in Britain, informed as it was by actuarial models 
derived from Gompertz’ work on the ‘mortality function’ (Moreira, 2017: 36-40). As 
Foucault put it, governmentality was – and indeed is – underpinned by ‘the absolutely 
capital concept … of risk’ (Foucault, 2009: 87). 
Recently, Wahlberg and Rose (2015) have proposed that in the past four decades it is 
possible to identify a shift in the forms of knowledge produced about populations. This 
transition can be described as a shift from a focus on life and death to a situation where the 
emphasis lies in measuring and calculating aggregate states of disability and health on a 
global level. In this process, the social conditions and the personal consequences of living 
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with disease become objects of political concern that are made knowable, quantifiable, and 
thus targets of intervention. Wahlberg and Rose argue further that this denotes a new 
epidemiological style of thought in which ‘the problem of morbid death gives way to that of 
morbid living, made calculable through metrics of “severity”, “disability” and “impairment”’ 
(Wahlberg and Rose, 2015: 60). The shift Wahlberg and Rose propose is significant, since it 
opens the possibility that new articulations between populations and politico-epistemic 
apparatuses have emerged.  
This article takes as a point of departure the shift from measures of life and death to metrics 
of population health. It asks: To what extent was this transition achieved, and negotiated, 
and how, through what means and processes? I propose that these questions can be 
addressed by analysing the transcripts and sociotechnical network of one single meeting 
held at the United States Senate on July 15th 1983. The meeting, a hearing before the 
Subcommittee on Savings, Pensions and Investment Policy, specifically focused on analysing 
‘whether [the then] current life expectancy projections [were] accurate’ (Chaffee in US 
Senate, 1983: 1). By publicly recognizing the uncertain character of the main source of 
information on which – the just reformed – US social security programmes were based, i.e. 
actuarial projections, the meeting constitutes a unique moment in the collective 
examination of the forms of expertise, methods, calculation techniques and types of data 
used in making demographic and epidemiological projections and forecasts.  
The justification for focusing on this specific Senate Hearing is threefold. One is that the 
meeting constitutes a temporary centre of calculation (Latour, 1987) articulating an 
extended sociotechnical network, making it visible and durable. This capacity to stabilize 
connections is linked to the second reasons for focusing on it. Like the evidence-appraisal 
committees analysed by Moreira (2005) and McGoey (2007), the meeting is a deliberate 
attempt to tame the proliferation of uncertainties in a knowledge domain. Second, by 
transporting emerging uncertainties about life expectancy projections into a confined space, 
Hearing members were enabled to ‘problematize’ (Callon, 1986) population science 
projections, tracing the links between different approaches to measuring population health, 
the technological expectations that such measures embody, and contemporaneous health 
and social security plans. Third, this close scrutiny of the assumptions and corollaries of life 
expectancy calculations was not without consequences. Through the ceremonial order of 
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the Hearing, calculations publicly viewed as a consequence of inexorable processes of 
population change became tractable objects underpinned by data collection conventions, 
mensuration practices and scenarios of technological expectation. As a result, the Hearing 
turned a loose, and weakly articulated set of approaches to life expectancy calculations into 
a controversy: an identifiable and shared uncertainty around a specific issue or ‘object’, 
around which gathers a variety of actors, instruments and practices (Callon et al., 2009; 
Latour, 2005). The meeting thus enables us to understand the uncertainties surrounding the 
contemporary research and policy agenda on how to combine mortality with morbidity or 
health outcome measures (Murray et al., 2002; also Lancet, 2018).  
I suggest that this was possible because the Hearing focused on the role of ‘calculative 
devices’ (Callon, 1998; Callon and Muniesa, 2005), such as life tables – tabular descriptions 
or estimates of the pattern of mortality survival in populations – in producing projections of 
longevity and health. By opening up the uncertainties underpinning what Lakoff (2015) has 
termed actuarial devices – in rendering their contingent character public – members of the 
Hearing were able to propose alternative arrangements that could make visible and 
knowable the complex relationship between health and longevity.  
Through this close analysis of the Hearing, the paper provides insight into the contemporary 
politics of population health. Two clearly delineated standpoints emerged in the meeting. 
One entwines optimistic expectations of the impact of preventive or therapeutic 
technologies on health and longevity with fiscally conservative policies; the other enacts a 
conjunction between modest technological expectations and fiscally ‘liberal’ programmes to 
support health and social care programmes. The relationship between these positions is 
redolent of the tension between ‘hope’ and ‘truth’ that pervade the contemporary domain 
of health (Clarke, 2016; Moreira and Palladino, 2005;).  
  
Staging the vitality controversy 
On the morning of July 15th 1983, in Washington DC, the Subcommittee on Savings, 
Pensions and Investment Policy of the Committee on Finance of the United States Senate 
held a hearing on ‘Trends in US life Expectancy’ in room SD-213 of the Senate Dirksen 
Building. The Hearing had been instigated by the Chairman of the Subcommittee, Senator 
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John Chafee (Rep., Rhode Island), with support from Senator Bob Dole (Rep., Kansas), due to 
‘a nagging suspicion that we are not taking into account adequately the increased life 
expectancy of Americans in our projections of the costs of social security’ (Chafee in US 
Senate, 1983: 6).  
Although noting, in the meeting, that this ‘suspicion’ was mainly based on personal 
experience and anecdote, Chafee was drawing on a growing concern, amongst population 
science experts and policy makers, that life expectancy forecasts produced by the Office of 
the Actuary (OoA) were no longer reliable. Between 1977 and 1981, the OoA had 
considerably revised its mortality projections in response to changing demographic and 
epistemic conditions. This was due to two main reasons. On the one hand, while between 
the mid-1950s and the 1960s there had been relative stability in mortality rates in the US 
population, these had been significantly reduced in the first years of the 1970s. On the 
other, while the earlier stability in mortality fit within the expectations of population 
scientists and actuaries about the ‘natural’ limits of human life expectancy, the new 
emerging pattern of mortality was at odds with dominant demographic models about the 
role of mortality, and gains in longevity in older age groups in the dynamics of populations 
(Manton, 1991). As a result, Social Security Administration projections of mortality for the 
year 2000 were higher than mortality rates already observed in 1975 (Myers, 1981; also 
Rice, 1978). 
The uncertainty of mortality and life expectancy projections was not a purely academic 
issue, but a matter of public concern. In particular, these calculations not only fed directly 
into taxation and spending plans for social security and health care programmes such as 
Medicare, but also informed occupational retirement and health care insurance policies 
across the country. Indeed, just a few months before, the Federal Government had 
completed a fundamental reform of social security in the US, the Social Security 
Amendments of 1983. This policy was itself derived from the sparking of a political ‘crisis’ 
about the financial sustainability of the social security system around 1982, when policy 
makers and commentators denounced the fact that the ‘old-age and survivors insurance 
trust fund’ had reached its lowest ever balance. Facing resistance to his original proposals to 
solve the ‘crisis’, President Reagan formed a Bipartisan Commission – known subsequently 
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as the Greenspan Commission – tasking it with developing a plan that would save $40 billion 
in the ‘unified budget’. 
The Greenspan Commission proposed to meet that challenge in four interlinked ways: a) 
extend the coverage of the system, by mandatory enrolment of Federal and other local 
government workers; b) tighten the efficiency of the program, c) increase the tax revenue 
coming into the system, and d) ration the entitlement conditions of the system, particularly 
by increasing the retirement age. The last proposal is of significant interest to this analysis: 
firstly, because it was both the most contentious – with the American Association for 
Retired Persons (AARP) leading the critique (US Senate, 1983: 153-5); and, secondly, 
because it explicitly linked the sustainability of the system to changes in life expectancy 
calculations. Indeed, for this purpose, Alan Greenspan specifically asked Myers, a fiscally 
conservative Republican and former Chief Actuary for the Social Security Administration 
(SSA), to provide a possible retirement age that would, in 1980, be ‘equivalent’ to the one 
established in 1940 (Bayo and Farber, 1981; Tynes, 1988: 30). The request laid open the link 
between social security institutional arrangements and calculations of life expectancy.  
This connection had already become publicly unstable through the publication of alternative 
projections of life expectancy based on different ‘mortality assumptions’ (Crimmins, 1983; 
also Manton 1982). ‘Mortality assumptions’ are conceived as ‘judgements’ made by 
actuaries and populations scientists on how and at what rate mortality rates will evolve in 
the years ahead and beyond (e.g. ONS, 2016). In the event, Crimmins’ view that, contrary to 
the reversal proposed by the OoA, ‘mortality changes observed [from] 1968 to 1977 [were 
to] continue unaltered to 2000’ (Manton in US Senate, 1983: 59), further questioned the 
assumptions held by the actuarial status quo. Drawing on these uncertainties, Chafee 
argued at the beginning of the Hearing that policy makers and the public ‘cannot afford to 
blind [themselves] foolishly to the fiscal and societal effects of leaps in scientific knowledge’ 
(Chafee in US Senate, 1983: 4; emphasis added).  
To illustrate his argument, Chafee drew on a figure and table provided by the National 
Centre for Health Statistics (Figure 1), which he structured as a narrative of continuous gains 
in longevity through human history. The figure deserves special attention because it 
inscribes – or inscripts (Latour and Woolgar, 1979) – in its differently shaped curves the 
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relationship between ‘quantity’ and ‘quality’ of life referred to above. ‘Survivorship curves’, 
widely used in actuarial science, demography and population ecology, depict how mortality 
varies with age of individuals in one particular population. Derived either from past/current 
life table data – or from forecasted/conjectural survival probabilities based on mortality 
assumptions – they are understood as statistical abstractions. Within them, survival 
probabilities obtained cross-sectionally for different age groups at one given historical time 
are converted into a graphical inscription of a single cohort’s mortality function. The figure 
provides thus what can be thought of as ideal types of mortality function.  
The curve attributed in the figure to ‘Ancient Rome’ populations – often known in 
population ecology as a Type III curve – describes a cohort with a high death rate following 
birth, tapering after that. The ‘USA 1900’ curve is characterized by a more constant 
mortality rate throughout lifespan. The curve for ‘USA 1960’ is one seen to be approaching 
the ‘rectangularization of longevity’ – the title which heads the figure. This is a scenario in 
which high survivorship rate throughout the lifespan sees mortality accumulate at the end 
of life. The last curve, rectangular – dotted in the picture – exhibited a ‘theoretical 
possibility’ of ‘ideal senescence’ proposed by Raymond Pearl in 1940 (Pearl, 1940; see 
Comfort, 1964: 24; Ramsden, 2002). 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 APPROXIMATELY HERE] 
As already mentioned, the prospect of bringing to bear such ‘rectangularization of longevity’ 
in human populations had been given public airing by James Fries just a couple of years 
before. Supported by Kaiser Permanente – a California-based non-profit integrated health 
care system, often seen as the model for the health maintenance organization system 
adopted in the US – Fries proposed that ‘if all premature death were eliminated … statistics 
suggest that … under ideal societal conditions mean age at death is not far from 85 years’ 
(Fries, 1980: 131). His argument hinged on a particular, and much contested, interpretation 
of life tables and mortality rates during the 1970s that linked increases in life expectancy to 
changes in lifestyle, better preventative medicine and ‘growth in personal autonomy and 
personal responsibility for health’ (Fries, 1980: 133). He thus suggested that pursuing these 
‘ideal societal conditions’ would result in a ‘compression of morbidity’, a shorter average 
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period between the onset of disability and what he, drawing on Hayflick (1965), saw as the 
‘biological limit to lifespan’.  
The fact that the Hearing’s proceedings were framed by these proposals is significant 
because they both challenged directly the OoA’s mortality assumptions and more 
established views on the effects of life expectancy changes on disability on older 
populations. Indeed, one can argue, following Manton (1991; also Jacobzone et al., 1999;; 
OTA, 1985; Pugh, 1987; Preston, 1993) that the Hearing was one of the key events in the 
crystallization of the content and format of the controversy on the relationship between the 
‘quantity’ (survival, life expectancy) and ‘quality’ (health, disability) of life that still pervades 
population science. The power of meetings such as Senate hearings to transform issues is 
linked to the way in which they enable the public, ceremonial performance of expertise 
(Hilgartner, 2000). This meant that the usual interactional structure of questioning of expert 
in public hearings – namely, ‘you say this but someone else says another thing’ – facilitated 
the creation of a recognizable map of relative positions within a controversy (Lezaun, 2010). 
In this, a key role was played by calculative devices. This is because the controversy was not 
only about ‘vitality’ per se, but most importantly about how vitality should be measured and 
its temporal variations monitored. Could the health of populations be measured and 
supervised by life tables alone, as actuaries and populations scientists had done for more 
than a century, and as the representatives of the OoA argued in the meeting? Alternatively, 
as proposed by Manton, should other forms of data about health and disability – and 
related techniques of calculation – be taken into account and combined with mortality 
data? Far from straightforward, technical questions, these interrogations problematized the 
very character of the relationship between data, calculative techniques, expert practice, 
policy makers and the public. These were thorny questions, of substantial consequence for 
health and retirement systems.  
Life tables constitute one of the most stable calculative devices in population science, from 
which survivorship curves and computations of life expectancy derive. By contrast, there 
was no accepted, ‘universal’ way of measuring population health – the quality of life lived by 
the surviving population. Just a few years before the Hearing analysed here, Sullivan (1971) 
had published what is considered a seminal contribution to the measurement of health: an 
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index of ‘health expectancy’. Designed to assist decision-making when ‘public health 
programmes compete with each other and with other government activities for budget 
allocations’ (Sullivan, 1966: 1), the proposed device was explicitly justified by the need to 
formulate new approaches to population health measurement in a context where, despite 
developments in health technology, there was, as referred above, an observed stabilization 
of mortality levels in the population. New forms of measurement were necessary, it was 
argued, not because of technologically driven improvements in life expectancy, but because 
it was believed that technological advances in chronic disease management would only 
affect the ‘quality’ of life, not its quantity (Moryama, 1964). 
However, at the time, as the joint WHO/International Epidemiological Association Study 
Group on Measurement of Levels of Health put it, it was ‘generally thought impossible to 
arrive at a composite health scale to suit all comparative situations’ (Ipsen, 1979: 16). One 
of the main challenges of implementing this approach was the lack of suitable, available 
data to measure morbidity in a sustainable way (Sullivan, 1971). This problem continued to 
be evident both to Fries (1980: 133) and to Manton (1982) a decade later. This was because 
there was uncertainty about which data should be collected and for what purposes. Was it 
necessary to obtain data on illness as well as the impact illness had on function and 
activities, as suggested by Sullivan (1971)? Or was the data collected by the National Centre 
on Health Statistics on illness-linked mortality enough to forecast future trends in life 
expectancy? How were these different sets of data to be combined and composed? 
Calculative devices had thus an intervening capacity in shaping the controversy on the 
relationship between the vitality of populations and health technology because, as the 
meeting made clear, they carried complex assumptions about what population health 
outcome was politically relevant to measure. 
Devicing technological expectations I 
The 1983 Senate Hearing on Trends in US Life Expectancy was, as we saw above, set up as 
an exercise in plotting different projections of life expectancy and how they relate to 
specific methods of estimation and forms of data. This was explicitly justified by emerging, 
‘nagging’ uncertainties about the robustness of forecasts provided by the OoA. It was the 
need to ‘take into account’, as Sen Chafee put it, the place of those forecasts within a wider 
space of scientific debate and controversy that made the meeting necessary, even if it 
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meant revisiting policy decisions that were ‘supposed to take care of the problem to the 
year 2000’ (Chafee in US Senate, 1983: 6). 
Unsurprisingly, given this context, the first witness of the Hearing was a representative of 
the OoA, Francisco Bayo. Recognizing the weight of public and private accountability bearing 
upon official mortality forecasts, Bayo’s starting point was the intrinsic nature of 
‘uncertainty about the future’ (Bayo in US Senate, 1983: 6). Explaining how the OoA 
established its ‘mortality assumptions’ underpinning forecasts, Bayo provided a historical 
periodization of ‘mortality decline’. In the years 1952 to 1968, a stabilization of mortality 
rates had led to the belief that,  
further declines in mortality would be difficult to achieve because most of the 
controllable diseases were already controlled and the remaining … degenerative 
diseases were very difficult to control (Bayo in US Senate, 1983: 8) 
Although this belief had been challenged by Crimmins and others (see above), Bayo, 
drawing on calculations of possible cause of death, was still reluctant to accept that future 
declines in mortality would be similar to those experienced in the first half of the twentieth 
century. Past experience was not enough to forecast future mortality: It was also necessary 
‘to use our imagination’ to factor the effect of technological developments and changes in 
lifestyle (Bayo in Use Senate, 1983: 8 and 22). As a result, the OoA produced a set of three 
forecasts, presented in detail in life expectancy tables from 1900 to 2080 (Idem: 37-8): one 
where mortality rates stabilized, another where mortality declines continued (as per the 
Crimmins calculations), and a moderate scenario where improvements in life expectancy 
would continue for another two decades and then taper off from 2007 onwards.  
Chafee, however, was doubtful whether the moderate forecast was sufficiently robust: 
Sen. Chafee: [T]o a layman, your current intermediate projections seem awfully 
unrealistic just in terms of historical record. … Why, for example, would you 
estimate such a drop of mortality improvement at about the turn of century, just 
as one might expect we could be making major breakthroughs against disease? 
Mr. Bayo: A good projection cannot just extrapolate historical trends [and] 
consideration must be given for the reasons for past declines and the likelihood 
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of future declines. … It must be remembered that a projection of continuously 
declining death rates implicitly assumes a continuous stream of breakthroughs in 
the control of disease and the ageing process. … A continuation of this recent 
trend [in mortality reduction] for the next 100 years seems highly unlikely. (US 
Senate, 1983: 41-42) 
In this exchange, Chafee questioned the quality of Bayo’s forecasts by making reference to 
the inaccuracy of previous, recent calculations of future life expectancy provided by the 
OoA. These errors were produced, he suggested, because of the way in which those 
forecasts focused on past mortality trends, and failed to take account of ‘major 
breakthrough against disease’ in the future. Bayo’s reply to the Senator makes clear that 
government actuaries did, in fact, take in consideration expectations of the effect of 
technoscientific innovation on life expectancy. Nevertheless, they were less ‘optimistic’ 
about the probability of ‘breakthroughs’ of the kind Chafee imagined.  
This contrast between an ‘optimist’ and a ‘modest’ or conservative position in relation to 
the future of biomedical innovation is key to understanding the unfolding of the meeting. 
Again, these two positions were not de-contextualized divergent ‘expert opinions’; rather, 
they had direct impact on the design and management of public institutions across the US:  
Sen Chafee: … I wonder Mr Bayo how closely you followed this Committee’s two 
year struggle to reach agreement on the Social Security salvation package? 
Significant changes – such changes in retirement age are very difficult … 
Wouldn’t it be better to represent conservative estimates of mortality that 
would if wrong provide a happy margin for the safety for these programmes? 
Mr. Bayo: … If specifically requested I would be glad to provide Congress with 
conservative estimates. In the meantime I interpret my principal responsibility as 
providing my best estimate. (US Senate, 1983: 42) 
As is made clear, an ‘optimist’ position on the effects of technology on human longevity 
would result in a fiscally ‘conservative’ arrangement, providing a ‘happy margin’ of available 
funds and ensuring the ‘safety of these programmes’ (see also Manton in US Senate, 1983: 
71). The charge appeared to be that by offering a ‘moderate’ assessment of the effects of 
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technology on life expectancy, the OoA was endangering the sustainability of the social 
security system. Lack of enthusiasm for the technoscientific promises of biomedicine and 
public health could result in the failure of the institutions protecting older and vulnerable 
citizens in the future. For Mr. Bayo, however, this charge was misplaced because it was the 
government that specified which type of forecast it required. This stance, in turn, enabled 
those questioning the panel to explore the basis of upon which this ‘best estimate’ rested. 
Wasn’t the problem that the OoA’s forecasts relied only on life table data and ignored 
‘improving techniques of data gathering and analysis’ relating to health and disease (Chafee 
in US Senate, 1983: 42)? Invited to represent the proposed melding of actuarial and 
epidemiological techniques in life expectancy forecasting were Jacob Brody, of the National 
Institute of Aging (NIA), and Kenneth Manton, of the Center for Demographic Studies at 
Duke University.  
Brody explicitly aligned his presentation with the Committee’s aim to bring a ‘new humility’ 
to life expectancy forecasts provided by actuaries. Such need for humility was encapsulated 
in two graphs he presented to the Hearing: one charting mortality from all causes between 
1900 and 1979, and another for the same period but focusing on people aged 65 and over. 
The charts showed, according to Brody, that while mortality decline for the overall 
population had occurred most rapidly between 1900 and 1920, shifts in mortality in the 
older population had occurred mainly after WWII, ‘for reasons we just do not understand’ 
(Brody in US Senate, 1983: 45; my emphasis). This was because, in his view, those decreases 
in mortality occurred before post-war biomedical breakthroughs or changes in lifestyle took 
effect. There was hence a deeper uncertainty about the relationship between technology 
and life expectancy which required ‘iterative approaches’ between methods of forecasting, 
and the use of techniques for monitoring rapid shifts in mortality – such as that then 
observed with AIDS – to enrich mortality assumptions in life expectancy calculations. 
Manton, for his part, argued that assessing the ‘reasonableness’ of life expectancy forecasts 
was a difficult business, because the assessment had to rely in part on the data on which the 
forecast themselves were based. Comparing the OoA and Crimmins life expectancy 
projections, Manton favoured the fiscally prudent/biomedically enthusiastic position. It was 
not only that the more ‘optimistic’ forecasts were aligned with the estimated changes in life 
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expectancy provided by authorities based on ‘elimination of cause’ method – by Bernard 
Strehler (1975) and Leonard Hayflick – or extrapolations from current trends (Fries, 1980), 
but also that ‘we may be entering a period of major medical advances’ which ‘may be traced 
to the increased funding after WWII of biomedical research on the mechanisms of chronic 
disease’ as well as the more recent investment in research in ‘basic aging processes’ 
(Manton in US Senate, 1983: 75).  
This assessment, Manton further suggested, justified changes in the infrastructure of data 
collection and analysis of trends in mortality and morbidity in the population. Manton 
argued that a series of questions emerged, though, regarding what direction this change 
should take. Should mortality at later ages be linked to one specific aetiology, and thus 
entangled with expectations from extant biomedical programmes related to that illness? Or, 
should they reflect multiple morbidities, and their underpinning by the ‘aging processes’ and 
loss of vitality? Was it, indeed, necessary to rethink the ‘basic conceptual’ relationship 
between mortality and morbidity so as to formulate ‘alternate modes of forecasting’? And 
what would those ‘alternate modes’ be?  
Both Brody and Manton agreed that it was necessary to monitor not only how changes in 
disability and ‘quality of life’ affected life expectancy forecasts but also how it could affect 
patterns of service use or retirement age. Yet their views of such trends were significantly 
different. Their presentations to the Committee questioned the narrative of 
‘rectulangurization of longevity’ with which Senator Chafee had opened the meeting (Figure 
1). As noted above, Manton (1982) had published an assessment of the shifting relation 
between ‘quantity and quality of life’ a year before the meeting. The article suggested that 
increases in life expectancy would be complemented by an amelioration of the impact of 
disability on human populations. This, in turn, implied that, at older ages (i.e. 85 years and 
over), populations might be experiencing some degree of ‘horizontalization of longevity’. 
Brody, on the other hand, was of the view that gains in life expectancy would be 
significantly offset by such ‘de-rectangularizing’ trends, resulting in an increase in the 
quantity of disability in the population. Leveraging his argument against Fries ‘compression 
of morbidity’ hypothesis, Brody proposed, just a few months later, that  
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Fries’ prediction … is based on the assumption … that there will be a 
postponement of the onset of chronic diseases. Fries suggests this can be 
achieved by preventive approaches such as stopping smoking … However, this 
optimistic view must be tempered by two realities: the absence of evidence of 
declining morbidity and disability in any age group, particularly those age 45 to 
64, and the increasing number of people who are reaching advanced age. If 
current trends continue, the fastest growing segment of the population will be 
those must vulnerable to chronic disease, the group aged over 85 [and this will 
entail that] more people will spend longer proportions of their lives afflicted with 
chronic diseases. Unless preventative measures are extraordinarily fruitful, or 
successful methods of threating or minimizing the impact of chronic diseases of 
aging are developed, we will be faced with a burgeoning number of patients in 
need of long term care (Schneider and Brody, 1983: 855; also Brody, 1985)  
By highlighting their different assessments of the future relationship between mortality and 
morbidity, Manton and Brody effectively made the case for a different system of health 
surveillance. In a significant way, from their point of view, the Hearing was not the place to 
discuss whether the ‘rectangularization of longevity’ was occurring, but to shape the 
devices, procedures and institutions that would support the collective production of 
knowledge on population health. Indeed, the ceremonial enactment of disagreement 
justified the argument for the creation of a new health data management infrastructure 
supported by, for example, ‘modern computer technology [and] new tools such as the 
National Death Index’ (Brody in US Senate, 1983: 45).  
The need for new calculative devices, and new forms of data collection, resulted from a 
critical appraisal of the life table as a technology of insurance. The life table, it was argued, 
was limited in its capacity to monitor and forecast changes in populations where life 
expectancy responded to shifts in patterns of mortality across the life course. These 
patterns where themselves sensitive to complex causality processes in the production of 
health, some of which, as Brody put it, ‘we just do not understand’. The new devices – and 
the infrastructure that they embedded – aimed at melding actuarial and epidemiological 
procedures and ways of reasoning, promising to make the monitoring of population health 
more sensitive to change, so as to avoid another ‘social security crisis’. Political and 
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institutional stability could only be guaranteed, Manton and Brody seemed to be arguing, if 
the calculative infrastructure of population health took seriously the question of the 
relationship between quantity and quality of life. New devices were needed to mediate 
between a new dynamics of population health and a new politics of social security and 
health care. 
Devicing technological expectations II  
In the previous section, I explored how the Senate Hearing on Trends in Life Expectancy was 
able to open up uncertainties about the robustness of existing methods of calculation of 
probability of death for different age groups. In particular, I described how the OoA’s ‘best 
estimate’ on future life expectancy was weakened by a close scrutiny of its methodological 
procedures and a critique of its technological conservative assumptions about the pace and 
effect of biomedical innovation on health and mortality in future populations. New devices 
and data systems were proposed that could enact the complex, indeterminate and 
multifarious nature of population health.  
Questions remained, relating to whether the magnitude of uncertainty and disagreement 
about the shape of future populations health clearly justified such an overhaul of the 
systems of data management and expertise on which social security and health care 
systems relied. What would be the difference between ‘technologically conservative/fiscally 
liberal’ and ‘technologically optimistic/fiscally conservative’ approaches on the future 
budgetary structure of social security and linked health care systems? As Bayo clarified in 
both his written submission and his witness statement,  
The cost of the program under the intermediate [mortality] assumption is now 
estimated at 12.84 % of taxable payroll. If we use the [most technologically 
conservative] assumption, that is people dying sooner, the cost will decrease by 
about 2/3 of 1% of taxable payroll. If we use the [most technologically optimistic] 
assumptions, that is of people living longer, then the cost will go up by about 1% 
of payroll. … What I wanted to emphasize is that the increase or decrease in cost 
is not as large as we would imagine at first sight. (Bayo in US Senate, 1983: 9-10) 
With this statement, Bayo wanted to re-assure the Committee that if projections based on 
mortality assumptions differing from those underpinning the 1983 Social Security 
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Amendments were to come to pass, the budgetary consequences would not be 
unsurmountable. Such reassurance was, as Chafee’s subsequent questioning makes clear, 
itself underpinned by an assumption about future Congresses’ willingness to raise taxes, or 
re-design the system so as to ensure the sustainability of social security and related health 
care programmes. For the public, 1% meant ‘a very, very large sum of money, and indeed 
could significantly affect the viability of the system’ (Chafee in US Senate, 1983: 40). By 
stressing the uncertainty infusing the political ability or willingness to raise taxes to this 
effect, Senator Chafee was marking a key boundary between Bayo, who, if only for 
representing ‘the accuracy of the cost estimate’, was prepared to assume a fiscally liberal 
position, and himself who – along with Senators Dole, Myers and others – had represented 
the fiscally conservative stance in the social security crisis of 1982-83.  
This meant, in effect, that a fiscally conservative position entailed exploring possible states 
of population health that went beyond the different mortality assumptions of the OoA, or 
the prospects offered by the melding of actuarial and epidemiological techniques. 
Rhetorically, the argument worked as follows: while fiscally liberal policymakers might be 
satisfied with underwriting cost estimates based on unreliable life expectancy forecasts, 
fiscally conservative ones would want to embed safety in the system by considering ‘the 
ramifications of [experts] being wrong’ (Chafee in US Senate, 1983: 44). Crucially, this also 
meant going beyond the ‘rectangularization of longevity’ expert narrative which had initially 
framed the meeting (see above).  
In venturing in this direction, the Committee was not charting previously unknown politico-
epistemic territory. Five years earlier, the Select Committee on Aging of the House of 
Representatives had held a hearing on ‘Life Extension and Tomorrow’s Elderly’, which aimed 
to assess the imaginable effects of technological innovation on life span. One of the 
witnesses to that 1978 Hearing was Alex Comfort, a leading gerontologist of the time 
(Comfort, 1976). He argued that the current innovation system, focused as it was on 
components of age related morbidity (illnesses), would enable the ‘rectangularization of 
longevity’. However, a new emerging technological approach to vitality explored ‘the 
possibility of resetting the clock’ that controlled the onset of age-associated morbidity 
(Comfort in House of Representatives, 1978: 17; also Comfort, 1968, Moreira, 2017). 
Comfort’s suggestion was that ‘any intervention which alters the basic datum of the lifespan 
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even by 0.25% is going to knock the floor out of all actuarial forecasting’ (Comfort in House 
of Representatives, 1978: 18; my emphasis).  
Supporting Comfort’s claims was his friend Leonard Hayflick. Hayflick was, by then, famous 
for the discovery of the celullar replicative limit (cellular senescence), which overturned 
previous theories about the potential immortality of cultured cells, and the related 
hypothesis that ageing related illnesses were ‘whole organism’ phenomena (see above; also 
Landecker, 2009). Hayflick presented himself as ‘more negative than Dr. Comfort’ on the 
possibility of fundamentally modifying the conjectural ‘biological clock’ that regulates 
human longevity (Hayflick in House of Representatives, 1978: 29). His more unassertive 
account of the promises of ‘fundamental research on the biological causes of ageing’ came 
from his view that not only research on this domain was still incipient but also because 
there was a lack of reflection about the ‘complex problems’ that life extension could bring in 
future, particularly how to balance the trade-offs between quantity and quality of life 
(Hayflick in House of Representatives, 1978: 29-31).  
Emulating the pairing of experts in the Hearing on Life Extension, the Senate Hearing on Life 
Expectancy invited Roy Walford from UCLA, who had been a witness on the Greenspan 
Commission, and, again, Hayflick, by then President of the Gerontological Society of 
America. Their role, as suggested above, was to shore up the fiscally conservative stance by 
providing a bolder horizon of technological promise on life expectancy, and in so doing, to 
re-shape the techniques and procedures used to quantify population health. However, re-
imagining the future of population health from the perspective of ageing research had 
consequences for how the success of the innovation system was evaluated and made 
accountable. In particular, it raised questions about what type of ‘health’ innovation 
systems were strategically pursuing, and how it could be measured; that is to say, questions 
about the very ability of different calculative devices in bringing to bear the states of health 
that would be publicly desirable.  
Focusing on the strategic aims of the innovation system, Walford distinguished between 
‘curve squaring technologies’ and those aiming to modify the ageing process, which he 
termed ‘span extending technologies’ (Walford in US Senate, 1983: 117). In this sense, he 
was echoing fellow gerontologists Comfort and Strehler (1975; Figure 2), by arguing that 
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biomedical research – with its focus on disease specific programmes – could only extend life 
expectancy to the limits calculated by Fries and others. Although such a ‘rectangularization 
of longevity’ scenario had significant implications for public and private retirement and 
health care programmes, as the Hearing had made clear, it was based on the expectation 
that gains in health and life expectancy were most likely to occur at older ages. This reduced 
the range of socio-economic consequences arising from that scenario, mostly concerned 
with shifting age-dependency ratios and retirement age. Consequently, he argued that 
focusing on ‘curing diseases had bad economic potential for the population’ (Walford in US 
Senate, 1983: 119).  
[INSERT FIGURE 2 APPROXIMATELY HERE] 
Conversely, life extending technologies would work by stretching the period of ‘adult 
vigour’, leading, in the long run, to a ‘biological and social revolution’ (Walford in US Senate, 
1983). Again, life tables and survival curves as calculative devices were key to the 
articulation of this technoscientific promise. As can be seen from Figure 2, extracted from 
Strehler’s (1975) key paper on the ‘implications of aging research for society’, curves A, B 
and C represent the calculable space of longevity within the technological frame proposed 
by biomedicine and public health. This is one where, by elimination of causes of death, a 
more square survivorship curve would be obtained (also US Senate, 1983: 141). Curves D, E 
and F inscribe, on the other hand, an alternative calculable space, where through the 
application of technologies that fundamentally alter human genomic and homeostatic 
processes, the ‘whole [curve] would move to the right’ (Comfort, 1968: 100). This new 
biopolitical order would be underpinned by a re-structured life-course, with five generation 
families, multiple successive careers, and lead to a new intergenerational economic contract 
(also Walford, 1983).  
Hayflick again played the role of the more ‘realistic’ forecaster, mediating between the 
actuarial, the epidemiological and the gerontological positions as they were enacted in the 
Hearing. He agreed with Walford – and Brody – that the current technoscientific horizon of 
‘rectangularization of longevity’ inevitably ‘would increase the proportion of older people’ 
and therefore of frailty and disability in the population (Hayflick in US Senate, 1983: 199). 
Yet, he was unsure whether it would be possible to create the new biopolitical order 
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promised by Comfort and Walford. Hayflick identified two significant barriers to the 
fulfilment of this promise. One, as suggested above, was that policymakers and researchers 
were ensnared in the technological pursuit of the ‘postponement of death’. This normative, 
strategic goal was reinforced by how the success of technological innovation in health was 
measured, which constituted the second obstacle. Measuring improvement in population 
health through increases in life expectancy, Hayflick seemed to argue, entangled population 
health in a narrow and limited quest. What was instead required was the creation of a new 
system of measurement that detected and monitored the maintenance of ‘adult vigour’, 
and substituted calculations indexed to chronological age with ‘biological age’ (Moreira, 
2017).  
Gerontologists thus presented a challenge to the actuarial status quo that was substantially 
different from that posed by epidemiologists. While the latter proposed that new calculative 
procedures and data systems were necessary to monitor the complex, indeterminate and 
multifarious nature of population health, gerontologists highlighted the close 
interconnection between the systems used to measure population health and the 
expectations put on the biomedical innovation system. They questioned whether 
‘rectangularizing longevity’ should be the consensual promissory horizon of technomedicine 
and public health; in so doing, they identified the limits of the biomedical imagination. To 
the committees’ question about the reasonableness of their own, alternative 
technoscientific promise, Hayflick argued that since ‘predicting the course of scientific 
progress [was] inherently unscientific’ (Hayflick in US Senate, 1983: 199), actuarial, 
epidemiological and gerontological forecasts should be seen in same light. However, while 
actuarial and epidemiological techniques locked scientific, public health and health care 
institutions in the management of age-related diseases (and in the question of the trade-off 
between quantity and quality of life), gerontological research and techniques of 
measurement could unravel a new form of population management.  
Rather than focusing on the likelihood and desirability of such promises (e.g. Anton, 2013), 
crucially, from the point of view of this article, Hayflick and Walford uncovered how the 
limits of the biomedical imagination were maintained by calculations of life expectancy. In 
this regard, they questioned whether the melding of mortality and morbidity could actually 
break the bounds between what Foucault labelled ‘insurance or regularizing technology’ 
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(Foucault, 2003: 222) such as life tables, survival curves, and mortality assumptions, and a 
society that ‘regards the increasing number of older people as a burden which must be 
endured’ (Hayflick in US Senate, 1983: 203), the ‘ageing society’. To create the ‘Long Living 
Society’ (Walford, 1983: 176-202), it was necessary to re-arrange the pairing of 
technological expectations and the system of monitoring population health, it was 
necessary to device population health differently.  
Conclusion 
In this paper, I have addressed the questions of whether, to what extent and through what 
means was a shift from mortality to morbidity achieved in the knowledge and management 
of contemporary populations. The analysis presented here suggests that there has been a 
re-composition of the problematic of population health. Specifically, population health 
sciences are now primarily concerned with investigating the relationship between mortality 
and morbidity or health. I have done this by analysing the proceedings and sociotechnical 
network of one particular Hearing in the US Senate in 1983. This meeting, I argued, publicly 
stabilized the relative position of diverse expert views on the techniques and procedures of 
calculating forecasts of population health, and brought those to bear on the policies and 
budgets of social security and health care programmes.  
The Hearing analysed in the paper did this by focusing on two questions:  Were life 
expectancy calculations based on life tables alone an adequate technique to monitor and 
forecast populations? What could alternative calculative devices do to population health? 
The statements and proceedings of the meeting provided two answers to this question, 
which were the focus of the two previous sections of the paper. One the one hand, devices 
inscribe what factors are taken into account in the production of population health. They 
make available the list of relevant entities – and related data – from which health is 
calculated. They also determine how ‘health’ is enacted in its measurement. On the other, 
devices themselves frame the making of technological expectations on human health and 
longevity. They constrain the possibilities of conceivable, imaginable future populations. 
But, conversely, these ‘inherently unscientific’ estimations also limit the scope, aim and 
structure of calculative devices, dictating what measurement of population health should be 
pursued and calculated.  
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My argument was not that there was a causal relationship between the meeting and 
contemporary population health science by establishing a foundational ground for a field of 
research. Instead, my argument was that the Hearing clearly articulated what have become 
contemporary concerns about the measurement of health. It did so by defining - in a public 
forum - the relative positions in a continuing controversy about the future of population 
health. Contrary to versions of this controversy that emplaced it solely in the technical 
domain and extrapolate consequences for health care and retirement budgets, the analysis 
of the meeting presented above showed how it laid bare the intricate relationship between 
the technical and the political.  I suggested that this was because the meeting made explicit 
how devices used to measure population health are entangled with differing expectations 
about the effects of health technology on human health and illness, and corresponding 
divergent visions of future human societies. As the Hearing proceedings make clear, 
calculative devices are key instruments in making those futures possible, in bringing them to 
bear.  To put in another way, the analysis of the meeting enables us to understand why the 
problematic of population health measurement is central to the governance of 
contemporary societies.    
In the Hearing, two standpoints on this problematic are easily identifiable, one that binds 
optimist technological expectations to fiscally conservative policies, and another whereby 
modest expectations justify strong health and social care programmes in later life. As I 
suggested at the beginning of this article, the tension between these two positions might be 
usefully understood as part of the dynamic between the regimes of ‘hope’ and ‘truth’ in 
contemporary biomedicine (Moreira and Palladino, 2005). In this dynamic, hope is 
concerned with the fabrication of expectations and future possibilities. Action is typically 
oriented towards the potential that knowledge-making embodies, valuing, for example, 
measurement techniques by the future they might be able to bring about. Truth, by 
contrast, is concerned with the fabrication of proofs and testing knowledge claims. Practice 
is thus oriented towards using measurement as a form of ‘reality test’. In the Hearing, these 
two positions became ensnared in a relationship of mutual interdependence, promissory 
technological scenarios hinging on the analysis of what the current situation is, and calls for 
accurate measurement of mortality and morbidity being justified by what a future, 
technologically-enhanced population health could be. Viewed through this lens, political 
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positions on population health that are generally seen as separate would be best analysed 
as entwined parts of the same assemblage, an assemblage that exactly relies on the 
iterative mutual criticism between these two politico-epistemic stances on population 
health. STS critiques of the making of technoscientific expectations in health and ageing 
might be merely reinforcing this dynamic rather questioning it.  
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